Revealed: Insights from a General's War Diary on Yom Kippur War Eve

Forty-six years after the Yom Kippur War, the IDF Archives at the Ministry of Defense have published the diary of the Chief of Staff during the war, David Elazar (Dado) z"l. This release was made possible after a request from the IDF Archives to a committee headed by former Supreme Court Justice, Professor Yitzhak Englard.

The diary, which was a key exhibit before the Agranat Commission that investigated the war events and led to Dado's removal, exposes the dramatic hours preceding the outbreak of war. At 4:30 AM on Yom Kippur, October 6, 1973, the Chief of Staff received an update from his office chief—and moments later from the then Chief of Intelligence, Major General Eli Zeira—that at 6:00 PM, Egyptian and Syrian forces would launch an attack on Israel. Within minutes, Dado addressed the Air Force Commander, Major General Benny Peled z"l, stating, "The intelligence is that there will be war tonight. We must treat this information as credible."

After receiving the news, the Chief of Staff convened a meeting in his office at 5:30 AM, attended by branch heads and IDF commanders. Chief of Intelligence, Major General Zeira, updated the group on the situation on the ground, explaining: "There are military indicators, actions, and reports which must be taken seriously." During the meeting, Dado authorized a limited reserve enlistment: "Permitting Operations Branch to call up reserves. Those essential for branch/arm readiness to complete alertness. Up to a few thousand people."

In a subsequent meeting at 7:15 AM, Zeira expounded on the intelligence picture in Egypt and Syria: "Most Russians are leaving Egypt and Syria at considerable scale and in a hurried manner. This isn't a break-the-tools departure." He noted that in Egypt "there's no chaos or the usual pre-war hustle and bustle; it may be hidden, or not as it appears. We have a night report that the attack will happen tonight. Politically, all doesn’t seem so, but indicators on the ground suggest otherwise." Following Zeira's comments, Dado concluded that "In light of this intelligence, the probability [of war] increases. Therefore, operating under the assumption that at 18:00 they will open."

The Chief of Staff reflected on his request to the political echelon to launch a preemptive strike, which was opposed by then Defense Minister Moshe Dayan z"l: "The Defense Minister at this stage opposes a preemptive strike. We will continue preparing the Air Force, dependent on intelligence accumulation, until noon. It is possible we might ask again in the afternoon; it's possible we won’t. If a preemptive strike isn’t approved, this afternoon we’ll be on immediate alert. I'm aware of the significant political limitations, but when we’re sure war is coming, it’s crucial to win as swiftly and effectively as possible."

Dado noted he recommended "a general, selective call-up, fewer marginal elements—about 200,000–250,000 people. This also isn’t approved now. Without a full call-up, we will do a partial call-up, about 70,000 people... This is the shortest alert we have ever considered, basically a 12-hour alert... We’ll call up what is authorized, the rest we’ll call up under fire. If [Arab armies] open fire tonight, the first stage will be containment, absorption, as best as we can. Tomorrow we’ll let the Air Force fight. By Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, we’ll concentrate forces and transition to a counterattack."

Addressing civilian evacuation from conflict zones, Dado clarified: "Golan Heights – evacuate women and children by night, a big trip to central Israel, accompanied by a man. Southern Command – Abu Rudeis – evacuate women and children. Provide air transport."

"It Matters to Kill Those Who Attack Us"

At 10:00 AM, a meeting took place at the supreme command post. "To me, the night is over," said the Chief of Staff. "This afternoon, I will instruct commands on how to conduct the nighttime war. I want to plan for the war on Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, for which I need your data, i.e., what the force buildup course is. I see the night as one of containment with what we have, plus limited aerial activity, and I see tomorrow as a day for the Air Force."

At 11:00 AM, Elazar met with Dayan. They discussed preparations for the anticipated Arab assault and reserve enlistment. Dayan, still skeptical about the reports of the impending Egyptian and Syrian offensives, asked the Chief of Staff, "Regarding reserve enlistment, what will happen if they don’t fire, when will all reserves be released?" The Chief of Staff replied that "If it doesn’t get postponed by a day or two but is canceled, then we’ll send the reserves home." Dayan continued his line, surmising, "[Egyptian President] Sadat might decide it’s not worth the second time. Because Sadat is one of those who banks a bit on surprise and a bit on it being Yom Kippur, and he’s already said yes and no fifty times. So, he might choose to back out." The Defense Minister added, saying, "The main goal is to destroy their forces, as we are not popular globally regarding the territories, but it’s important to kill those who attack us."

During the meeting, the Chief of Staff briefed the Defense Minister on the plan to cross the Suez Canal. "For the large-scale offensive of crossing the canal, we will need a number of days, with the days’ number contingent on how much we are destabilized in the defense line." Concluding the meeting, Elazar stated: "In this war, we observe tonight’s unpleasant hours and tomorrow—depending on the weather—because if they open fire, they are the attackers and we are the defenders. It’s a situation we’re not accustomed to, but we’ll see how we stand up to it."

At 12:20 PM, the Chief of Staff held a briefing with the then Southern Command officer, Major General Shmuel Gonen (Gorodish) z"l. Gorodish reported that contrary to intelligence suggesting war would break out in the evening, the UN confirmed that the Egyptians were about to open fire immediately. At 2:00 PM, sirens rang across Israel. The war had begun.